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This study investigates how the tenor of the political climate during a person's youth affects his or her 
attitudes towards immigration in adulthood. We analyze why cohorts formulate distinct patterns in 
attitudes towards immigration through a collective process of political socialization during the formative 
years. The theoretical arguments are tested using hierarchical age-period-cohort modelling across twelve 
cohorts in nine European countries using micro attitudinal data (2002 - 2016) integrated with historical 
macro political data. We find that contextual exposure to principles of equality and tradition in the 
formative political climate are central to the formulation of a person's attitudes towards immigration 
later in life. While the prevalence of the principle of equality affects immigration attitudes in adulthood 
positively, the principle of tradition does so negatively. The findings imply that even subtle and cyclical 
shifts in national politics affect the political orientations of those undergoing the process of political 
socialization. 
Keywords 
Political socialization, age-period-cohort analysis, attitudes to immigration, generational change, 
generational differences, cohort differences, political climate. 
Introduction1
The issue of immigration divides generations, prompting scholarly discus-
sions about how these differentiations emerge. Earlier studies have shown
that older people are more likely to express concerns about immigration
or hold negative attitudes about immigrants than younger people (Mayda,
2006; Quillian, 1995). Yet while prevailing stereotypes portray older people
as growing increasingly intolerant and prejudiced towards immigrants and
minorities as they age, existing research has shown that ageing – the process
of growing older – has no such effect (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Schuman,
Steeh and Bobo, 1985).
Recent research has empirically demonstrated that age-specific patterns
regarding immigration attitudes are due to a person’s year of birth, rather
than his or her biological age (Calahorrano, 2013; Gorodzeisky and Semy-
onov, 2018; McLaren and Paterson, 2019; Schotte and Winkler, 2018). The
reasons for this are not immediately apparent, as the trend from one cohort to
the next is non-linear and fluctuates (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018). In
other words, it is not simply a matter of older generations being more against
immigration than younger generations. Instead, it appears that age cohorts,
individuals born around the same time, experience a unique set of common
circumstances constituting a shared political socialization that somehow has
a long-lasting impact on their attitudes towards immigration.
The term ‘political socialization’ connotes a process of adaptation that
1This project was funded in part by the Swiss National Science Foundation. The
authors would like to thank the following persons for their comments and suggestions:
Elias Dinas, Anja Neundorf, Anastasia Gorodzeisky, Philip Jolly, and the participants of
the Political Behaviour Colloquim at the European University Institute.
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involves the perpetuation of principles, ideals, and norms from one genera-
tion to the next. While a typical setting for this occurs in the family, the
national political environment also matters. Young people are exposed to
normative ideals and principles via the “political tenor” of the larger society
(Levin, 1961). The role of the political climate in socialization is not a new
idea – yet surprisingly little effort has been made to understand the content
and contours of its influence. Establishing this is not immediately appar-
ent since “the differences between the political environments are not always
dramatically large: adjacent cohorts may not have experienced sets of polit-
ical events substantially different in their central political meaning” (Cutler,
1976, p.189). In our view, cohort differentiation in political behavior does not
necessarily require radical discontinuities in the political environment, such
as landmark events or regime change, which have drawn attention. Rather,
socialization can also proceed “by fits and starts” (Sears and Valentino, 1997,
p.46)
In this article, we examine the role of the political climate during forma-
tive years as an overlooked reason as to why differences in attitudes towards
immigration emerge across cohorts and persist later in adulthood. Existing
research on the formation of attitudes towards immigration or ethnic minori-
ties tends to focus on how social climates, such as the family (Dinas and
Fouka, 2018; Miklikowska, 2016), peers (Aboud and Amato, 2008), or school
(Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015; Thomsen and Olsen, 2017), act as socializing
agents. Our aim here is not to deny the role of these already established
micro and meso-level contexts as socializing agents. We appeal to the no-
tion that individuals are subject to simultaneous contexts of influence during
their socialization (for an overview see Hatemi and McDermott).
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We theorize that discontinuities in the prevailing principles of equality and
tradition during a person’s formative political climate impinge on their atti-
tudes towards immigration as adults. From this, we derive hypotheses that
we test using historical political data from the Manifesto Project Dataset
that we integrate with contemporary micro-data on attitudes towards im-
migration from eight rounds of the European Social Survey (2002 - 2016)
across twelve cohorts in nine European countries. To model the potential
effect of the political climate during the respondents’ formative years, we
conduct a hierarchical age-period-cohort analysis with synthetic age cohorts.
Our research design allows us to assess attitudes to immigration of cohorts
socialized between the years 1945 – 2008.
Our contribution to the scholarly literature is twofold. Firstly, with no-
table exceptions (Grasso et al., 2019; Smets and Neundorf, 2014), the political
climate of the larger society — that is the country as a whole — during a
person’s youth has been an understudied aspect of the political socialization
process. By focusing on early socialization, we contribute by theorizing how
the political climate of a person’s formative years becomes an important an-
tecedent to their attitudes towards immigration later in life. Secondly, we
also make a contribution to the scholarly understanding of attitudes towards
immigration. We do so by empirically demonstrating what factors contribute
to the formation of immigration attitudes during a person’s youth and how
these produce systematic differentiation between cohorts, a topic that is still
in its infancy.
3
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The Political Socialization of Cohorts
Political orientations tend to be acquired during a person’s impressionable
years, a critical period of young adulthood. Individuals experience a finite pe-
riod of ‘plasticity’ while they transition from adolescence to young adulthood
as they engage for the first time with social and political institutions (Hanks,
1981; Marsh, 1971; Neundorf, Smets and Garćıa-Albacete, 2013; Niemi and
Sobieszek, 1977; Sapiro, 2004). Due to this, political socialization, the process
through which an individual ‘acquires his political orientations, his knowl-
edge, feelings, and evaluations of the political world’ typically occurs during
this time (Dawson, Prewitt and Dawson, 1977, p.33) and reflects the adap-
tation of a person to their wider societal context.
The age stability argument postulates that the political predispositions a
person acquires in their youth are then crystallized and remain remarkably
persistent as the person grows older. As a result, these political orientations
are expected to be deeply entrenched and remain more or less stable over the
lifetime, and rarely subjected to change (Jennings and Markus, 1984; Lewis-
Beck, 2009; Sears, 1981; Visser and Krosnick, 1998). Still, the persistence of a
person’s pre-adult attitudes through their lifetime has been debated by schol-
ars (Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb, 1991; Sears and Funk, 1999). Empirical
evidence indicates that the orientations are more susceptible to change dur-
ing lifecycle events (such as getting married, becoming a parent, retiring from
the labor market). This occurs because attitudes towards symbolic political
issues have a strong affective basis which are based on symbolic predispo-
sitions crystallized during a person’s early years, unlike non-symbolic issues
which have a cognitive and informational basis (Henry and Sears, 2009).
As a person’s attitudes towards immigration are highly symbolic, it is
4
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then likely that they persist across the lifetime (McLaren, 2007; Schildkraut,
2010, 2014). In fact, previous empirical studies show that attitudes towards
immigration are stable over adulthood (Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008) in a
similar way to other group-related attitudes such as those towards ethnic
minorities (Sears and Funk, 1999). In line with this, a recent study demon-
strates that retiring from the labor market, an important lifecycle event, does
not affect a person’s attitudes towards immigration (Jeannet, 2018).
Assuming that attitudes towards immigration are formed quite early in
life and persist over a lifetime, we would then expect to observe a systematic
pattern in political behavior across cohorts. In other words, as attitudes
are understood to be “stamped” in young adulthood, each age cohort has
a different stamp due to different tempo-spatial contextual environments in
which they came of age (Schuman and Corning, 2012; Schuman and Rodgers,
2004; Schuman and Scott, 1989). It is widely recognized that through this
phenomenon, systematic differences emerge in values, beliefs, and attitudes
between cohorts that persist as they grow older (Abramson and Inglehart,
1992; Inglehart, 2008).
The Role of the Formative Political Climate
It is generally acknowledged that landmark political events, such as the Wa-
tergate political scandal or the Vietnam War, experienced during youth leave
their mark on a cohort’s political behavior (Dinas, 2013; Erikson and Stoker,
2011; Schuman and Corning, 2012). For example, Abrajano and Lundgren
demonstrate how landmark immigration legislation that was enacted dur-
ing a cohort’s impressionable years then influenced its immigration attitudes
later in life.
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Yet, landmark events are not a sufficient general explanation for intra-
cohort variation in attitudes, as even age-cohorts who came of age in the
absence of landmark political events still exhibit distinctive attitudes to im-
migration (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018). We build on Grasso et al.
(2019) and consider the diffuse political context in which a cohort came of
age, in contrast to previous more narrow interpretations, which focus on ex-
posure to specific political events or regime change affecting attitudes to im-
migration. Existing research regarding public attitudes towards immigration,
albeit sparse, provides support for the plausibility of the political climate’s
effect. For instance, a recent study links the mobilization of far-right political
elites to the resurgence of anti-immigration attitudes in younger generations
(McLaren and Paterson, 2019).
Drawing on both the empirical evidence of the contemporary political
context on a person’s political behavior (Conway, 1989; Layman and Green,
2006; Newman, 2013) and the theoretical understanding of the political so-
cialization of age-cohorts during the impressionable years, we argue that the
political climate during a person’s formative years is also an influential so-
cializing agent. Here, we define political climate as an ensemble of normative
principles, beliefs, ideals, and values that prevail in the political zeitgeist and
which are reflected in the views of the ruling political elites. In our case, we
focus on the formative political climate, which is the political climate dur-
ing a person’s impressionable years as opposed to the contemporary political
climate.
We put forward two principles that – partly – define a national polit-
ical climate, which we deem most likely to be related to the formation of
attitudes towards immigration. These are the principles of equality and tra-
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dition, both fundamental ideals2 in politics (Dahl, 2006; Schaefer, 2007).
The phenomenon of immigration is related to the pursuit of both of these
principles, but in opposing ways. The principle of maintaining tradition is
challenged by the arrival of immigrants, who bring their own norms and tra-
ditions, changing their host society in the process. On the other hand, the
principle of equality is bolstered by the arrival of immigrants, since this allows
for the expression of understanding, acceptance, and tolerance of “others”
(Davidov et al., 2008).
Therefore, through the process of political socialization, a political cli-
mate in which the principle of equality is common is expected to foster the
formulation of positive attitudes towards immigration, while a political cli-
mate rife with the principle of tradition is expected to foster the formulation
of negative ones. We expect the underlying mechanism to act through the
person’s normative adaptation to those principles that are most diffused in
politics at the time. We do not mean this in a simplistic sense, whereby a
formative political environment turns young people into fully-fledged egal-
itarians or traditionalists. Rather, the logic of our argument is somewhat
more nuanced. According to our line of reasoning a young person who is
inclined to view immigration in a negative manner, but who grows up in a
political environment with strong prevailing principles of equality, may ex-
press less negative views than if she had come of age in a political milieu
dominated by traditional principles.
The relative importance of principles of equality and tradition tends to
oscillate temporally along with the national political climate (Stimson, 1999).
This fluctuation provides variation in the extent to which cohorts are exposed
2Henceforth, we use the words principle, value, and ideal interchangeably.
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to these principles during the formative years. We expect that the variation
in this exposure then explains systematic patterns in attitudes towards im-
migration across cohorts later in life.
Based on our theoretical framework, we derive two testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals belonging to a cohort that experienced a for-
mative political climate where the principle of equality was predominant are
significantly more likely to express support for immigration than individuals
who do not.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals belonging to a cohort that experienced a for-
mative political climate where the principle of tradition was predominant are




Our interest is in explaining differences in individual attitudes to immigra-
tion across cohorts within countries. The complexity of our design requires
an accurate specification of influential factors at each level of analysis. To
test our hypotheses, micro-level data that include measures of attitudes to
immigration at the individual-level as well as contextual-level data for co-
horts and survey years in each country are required. In order to assess the
contextual socialization effect during respondents’ formative years, we collect
indicators that capture historical characteristics of interest (at the time when
8
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respondents were 18 years old) in each country. It is important to point out
that this operationalization assumes that each respondent was socialized in
the country in which he or she now lives.3 Although not necessarily con-
nected to our hypotheses testing, we also control for macro-level indicators
at the time when surveys were conducted in each country to capture the
current macro-level effects that affect all cohorts similarly.
At the individual level, the present analysis relies on biannual data from
the European Social Survey (ESS) for the period 2002 – 2016 in nine Euro-
pean countries across 108 country-cohorts (European Social Survey, 2018).
The ESS survey instrument has been widely used by scholars to measure
attitudes towards immigration (see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014)). Using
the ESS allows us to disentangle the effect of age, cohort and time period
on attitudes to immigration across a number of European countries, because
people of the same cohort in one country are observed at different stages of
their life as well as at different time periods. Moreover, due to using cross-
sectional data we are also able to observe different formative climates during
the same time period. We integrate the micro-attitudinal data from the ESS
with contextual data at the cohort and period level. These are gathered from
various sources, which are further described below.
The number of countries in our sample is restricted according to sev-
eral criteria. Firstly, we include only countries that participated in all eight
rounds of the ESS, in order to sufficiently estimate period effects. Secondly,
only countries for which data regarding our key independent (cohort and
3We take this into consideration in our models by controlling for individuals who are
not citizens of the country which they were surveyed in, to minimize the possibility that
they were not socialized there.
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period level) contextual variables were available are included. Finally, since
our main hypotheses expect an effect of fluctuations in the principles form-
ing the political climate of a country to play a key role in explaining cohort
differences in immigration attitudes, we included only countries that have
had a democratic political regime since 1945. This restriction ensures that
there was a possible fluctuation of the prevalent political climate over the
years typically associated with a multiparty system compared to dictato-
rial (one-party) systems. Thus, the final sample of countries includes Bel-
gium, Switzerland, Germany4, Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland, Nether-
lands, Norway and Sweden.
The sample is restricted to respondents born between 1931 and 1990 and
to those who were between 18 and 85 years old in the year of the survey.
These restrictions are imposed for several reasons. Firstly, we aimed to have
each cohort represented in as many periods as possible.5 Secondly, since we
are examining more complex attitudes, we would expect that political so-
cialization and the coming of age should occur when the respondents have
reached adulthood and not earlier (Bartels and Jackman, 2014). Therefore,
we expect respondents younger than 18 years old not to have had the chance
to fully socialize into the political culture and be entirely exposed to the po-
litical climate of their country. Moreover, 18 years is also the age when most
respondents entered the electorate in their respective countries, presumably
being more aware of the political reality compared to their younger coun-
4Due to historical disparities which likely influence differences between cohorts in the
two parts of Germany, we divided Germany into East Germany and West Germany. Only
respondents from West Germany have been analyzed.
5Only the youngest cohort (born between the years 1986-1990) is not present in every
period (it is not observed in survey year 2002).
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terparts. Finally, we necessitated a large enough number of observations in
every year of age. Given the small number of individuals over the age of 85
in our sample, we eliminated respondents who are 86 years old and older,
due to the uncertainty of the estimates for these cohorts.
Measurement
Our dependent variable is a composite index that measures a person’s overall
assessment of the impact of immigration on their society. Respondents were
asked three questions: (1) Would you say it is generally bad or good for [coun-
try]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries? (2) Would
you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by
people coming to live here from other countries? and (3) Is [country] made
a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other
countries? Answers are coded on an eleven-point scale where 0 is the most
negative and 10 the most positive reply. We created an additive index rang-
ing from 0 to 30.6 The index has been widely used by other scholars studying
attitudes to immigration (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018; McLaren and
Paterson, 2019; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Those respondents with missing
values on any of the three items7 were excluded from the analysis.8
6The Cronbach’s Alpha for the three items is 0.84, thus confirming that these items
measure a similar underlying concept.
7Overall, 3.76 percent of respondents (4,539) were excluded from the analysis because
of lack of information on any of the three items forming the dependent variable.
8As a robustness check, we also re-estimated the models including respondents that
answered at least two of the three items comprising our dependent variable. The results
obtained from this analysis were nearly identical to those presented here and are introduced
in Table A5.1 in the supplementary information.
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Apart from age, we included a set of demographic variables, such as
gender, university attainment, type of community the respondent resides in
(urban versus rural), subjective income difficulties9 and minority status as
controls. Following standard practice in age-period-cohort models (Reither
et al., 2015)), we divide the survey population into five-year country-cohorts,
where individuals in the sample are nested in twelve cohorts based on their
year of birth. The cohorts’ birth years range from 1931-1935 to 1986-1990.10
We excluded respondents with missing data in the individual independent
variables used in the regression analysis.11 Given the relatively small number
of cases with missing data (less than 5%) in the dependent and independent
variables combined, we applied listwise deletion. The final sample is thus
114,788 respondents. The list of countries, country codes, total sample size
for each country as well as for each of the ESS rounds are available in Table
A1.3 in the supplementary information.
Cohort-level variables
9Previous studies (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996) have
found that a perceived economic competition in the form of a pessimistic personal eco-
nomic outlook leads to greater negativity towards immigrants compared to an actual one
(Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993)
10As a robustness check, we also re-estimated the models using a different range of
cohorts. We created 21 cohorts with three-year intervals ranging from years of birth
between 1931-1933 to 1988-1990. The results obtained using these new cohort intervals
were highly similar to those of the main (five-year intervals) analysis. Results are presented
in Table 4.1 in the supplementary information.
11Overall, 1.34 percent of respondents (1,623) were excluded because of lack of infor-
mation in the independent variables.
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To test our expectations regarding systematic cohort differences in attitudes
to immigration, we introduce a series of country-cohort independent vari-
ables into our model. Firstly, information for all independent variables in
each country was gathered at the time respondents were 18 years old. Sec-
ondly, we then take the average across all years when respondents from one
cohort were 18 years old to obtain a single value for each indicator of interest.
For instance, for the oldest cohort (born between 1931-1935) in Belgium, any
given country-cohort independent variable is calculated as the mean value of
the independent variable in the years 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953 in
Belgium.
We hypothesize that fluctuations in principles of equality (H1) and tradi-
tion (H2) in the formative political climate explain the systematic differences
in attitudes towards immigration across age-cohorts later in life. We therefore
look at the presence of the principles of equality and tradition during times
when the respondents in our sample were socialized. We rely on data from
The Manifesto Project and measure the two principles as the share of quasi-
sentences calculated as a fraction of the overall number of allocated codes
per manifesto (Volkens et al., 2018). The principle of equality is understood
as a positive concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all
people.12 On the other hand, the principle of tradition is coded as positive
or favorable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values.13
12”This includes references to topics such as special protection for underprivileged social
groups, removal of class barriers, need for fair distribution of resources and the end of racial
or sexual discrimination”(Volkens et al., 2018)
13”This includes references to topics such as prohibition, censorship and suppression of
immorality and unseemly behaviour, maintenance and stability of the traditional family
as a value, and support for the role of religious institutions in state and society”(Volkens
13
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As the data in the Manifesto Project is provided at the political-party
level, we transform it into an annual measure by country. To do so, a weighted
average was calculated for each country-year. We weighted by the share of
votes that the party has received in the country’s last elections for two main
reasons.14 Firstly, this type of weighting accounts for the popularity of the
party and how likely it is that said party’s manifesto and general preferences
will receive attention in the country (for example through the media). It
is easy to imagine that in a country with few niche parties promoting the
ideal of equality, but also with one major party promoting the value of tradi-
tion, that the relative electoral support for the parties would matter for the
general political climate. It is reasonable to expect that the general politi-
cal climate would probably be more traditionalist than egalitarian. Secondly,
while taking into consideration the relative electoral importance of the party,
we account for both basic ways of how politics operates; the fact that politi-
cal parties influence the fundamental principles which emerge in the political
tenor (supply-side), but also the fact that these principles may be more or
less upheld by the citizens (demand-side).
We calculate the weighted mean of equality/tradition principles in the
formative political climate when cohorts were between the ages of 18 and
23. For instance, for the cohort born between 1931 and 1935 we calculate
the weighted mean of the emphasis on equality and/or tradition in political
et al., 2018).
14In the case of mixed electoral systems with a proportional and majoritarian compo-
nent, we use the vote share in the proportional component. In case of an electoral coalition
where programs for all members of the coalition and the coalition were coded, we set the
vote share to zero for the coalition program so that the sum of the share is not higher
than 100 percent.
14
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manifestos in each country for the years 1949-1953. The time trends in
equality and tradition across cohorts in the countries included can be found
in the supporting information in Figure A2.1 and Figure A2.2 respectively.
Apart from coming of age during distinct political climates, there might
be other cohort-level factors accounting for the variation in cohorts’ immi-
gration attitudes. Overall, educational attainment has increased in the last
decades in all European countries (Lutz et al., 2019), while higher educa-
tion has also been found to have positive effects on attitudes to immigration
(Cavaille and Marshall, 2019; Drazanova, 2017; Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015).
Thus, one would expect higher levels of education amongst younger cohorts
to play a role in inter-cohort differences in attitudes to immigration.15 In
order to test whether cohort differences in attitudes to immigration are due
to demographic differences regarding their level of education, we calculated
the percentage of university educated individuals within each cohort.16
We expect growing up with different degrees of ethnic diversity to play an
important role in intra-cohort differences in immigration attitudes. For in-
stance, younger cohorts of Europeans have had more opportunities for social
contact with foreigners and ethnic minorities than older cohorts. Native con-
15We would like to note that the two youngest cohorts (those born between the years
1980-1985 and 1986-1990) have a lower percentage of university educated individuals com-
pared to older cohorts, because in many instances (for example in the 2002 ESS survey
year), they were too young to have completed a university degree.
16We opted to calculate the percentage of university educated individuals within each
cohort instead of cohorts’ mean years of education. Years of education do not provide
enough information about the respondents’ educational level, since they may not be com-
parable across countries, especially if the countries’ respective educational systems are too
different.
15
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tact with minority groups, such as immigrants, is widely acknowledged as
a mechanism for improving inter-group relations (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew
et al., 2011). However, the opposite effect could also occur, whereby out-
groups provoke a real or perceived competition with in-groups over resources
and this, in turn, brings about more hostile attitudes towards immigration
among the native population (Olzak, 1992; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov, Rai-
jman and Gorodzeisky, 2006). To measure the extent of cohorts’ exposure
to ethnic (and immigration) diversity during their formative years, we use
two variables of interest. Firstly, we include data on countries’ net migra-
tion, available from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs’ Population Division (2017) since 1950. Data is provided in five-
years intervals. We therefore assigned each cohort a net migration value in
their respective country for the period when individuals in each cohort were
between 18 and 23 years old17. However, as McLaren and Paterson (2019)
rightly point out, net migration fails to capture the extent of cumulative over-
time diversity. For this reason, we also include a historical ethnic fraction-
alization index for each country in our sample, available annually since 1945
using Dražanová’s (2019) Historical Ethnic Fractionalization (HEF) dataset
(Drazanova, 2019).18 As with the previous variables, we calculated a single
mean value of the ethnic fractionalization index for each country-cohort.
17For example, for the oldest cohort born between 1931-1935 we assigned the estimated
net migration for the years 1950 – 1955, while we attributed the net migration estimate
for the years 1955-1960 to the cohort born between 1936-1940.
18The original ethnic fractionalization index ranges from 0, when there is no ethnic
fractionalization and all individuals are members of the same ethnic group, to 1, where
each individual belongs to his or her own ethnic group. For ease of interpretation, we
multiplied the original ethnic fractionalization index by 100.
16
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Cohorts entering the labor market when unemployment rates were high
were found to be more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants
(Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018). Therefore, we also control for countries’
unemployment rate at the time each birth-cohort was 18 years old as a proxy
for entering the country’s labor market. We draw on data from the OECD’s
Annual Labour Force Statistics, which provides the rate of unemployment
as the percentage of a country’s civilian labor force since 1956 (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2019). Again, we calculated
unemployment rate for each cohort as the mean value of the unemployment
rate in the years when each individual within a cohort was 18 years old.19
Period-level variables
Certain periods might exert a shift in attitudes for all individuals in soci-
ety, regardless of age or birth cohort. Therefore, in order to properly identify
cohort effects and disentangle them from eventual period effects, we also need
to control for period effects in our models. As the effect of time varying pro-
cesses might be different in individual countries, we control for period effects
with a series of country-period independent variables.
As with the country-cohort level variables, we include two country-period
variables measuring the relative dominance of equality and tradition in the
contemporary political climate. The relative dominance of the principles of
equality and tradition is calculated in a similar way to the case of country-
cohorts, but corresponds to the year in which the survey took place in each
country. To measure diversity, we apply the estimates of net migration for
19For the oldest cohort (1931–1935) we used only the value of the unemployment rate
in 1956, because of a lack of comparable data in previous years.
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each country in the corresponding year of the survey, retrieved from Euro-
stat. Unfortunately, data to calculate the ethnic fractionalization index were
not available for the latest rounds of ESS. We therefore used the measure of
foreign stock in each country as a proxy for ethnic fractionalization (Euro-
stat, 2019).20 Data regarding the harmonized unemployment rate were taken
from OECD’s Labor Market Statistics21 and reflect the total percentage of
unemployed labor force in each country. Variable coding and descriptive
statistics of all variables are available in Table A1.1 and Table A1.2 in the
supplementary information.
Methods
Research on cohort effects needs to address the potentially confounding influ-
ences of age and period effects when estimating models. In the literature this
issue is recognized as the age-period-cohort “identification problem” and is
well known in studies of this type (McKenzie, 2006; Yang et al., 2008). The
identification problem emerges because age, period and cohort effects are
linear functions of one another. As soon as we know two values, we simulta-
neously know the third, since age = period (year of survey) – birth year.
Our empirical strategy overcomes the identification problem by conduct-
ing a hierarchical age-period-cohort regression analysis (HAPC), which is
well suited for repeated cross-sectional survey designs (Zheng, Yang and
20We calculated the foreign stock of each country by dividing the number of the overall
population by the number of foreign nationals in the survey year. Further, we multiplied
the obtained results by 100.
21Data for Switzerland in the years 2002-2008 come from Harmonized Unemployment
Rate: All Persons for Switzerland fourth quarter.
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Land, 2011). HAPC analysis distinguishes between the three temporal phe-
nomenon of age, period (year of survey) and birth cohort (year of birth)
effects using micro-data (Yang and Land, 2013) (Yang and Land 2013). It
constructs synthetic cohorts based on age groups to compensate for the ab-
sence of longitudinal data, while individuals are cross-classified22, nested
in both country-period and country-cohort.23 In constructing cohorts, the
model is no longer perfectly collinear – when knowing the cohort and pe-
riod, one cannot determine the exact age of the respondent, but only a range
of possible ages. Moreover, constructing cohorts that include several birth
years is consistent with our theoretical expectations that there are no sharp
differences between individuals born in one year compared to another, “but
that distinctions are caused by relatively small changes over time such that
meaningful divisions are only observed between those whose formative years
are temporally distant from one another” (Down and Wilson, 2013, p.438).
In our case, this means that individual respondents can potentially belong
to different combinations of country-cohorts and country-periods.
Taking into consideration all of the above, we apply a hierarchical three
level age-period-cohort model, where individuals are nested simultaneously
within two second-level variables (country-cohort and country-period) as well
as nested within countries, since possible clustering at country level might
still occur. We also include random effects for cohorts and periods within
22In cross-classified data, lower level units do not belong to one and only one higher
level unit. Rather, lower level units belong to pairs or combinations of higher level units
formed by crossing two or more higher level classifications with one another.
23Following Yang (2008), we assume that while age is related to biological processes of
aging, cohort and period effects rather reflect the influences of external forces and as such
should be considered as macro-level variables.
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countries in our model.
The level-1 model is:
Yijkc = β0jkc + β1Xijkc + eijkc (1)
where, within each country-cohort j, country-period k and country c,
respondents’ attitudes to immigration (Y) are a function of their individual
characteristics (vector X). β0jkc is the mean of attitudes to immigration of
individuals in country-cohort j, country-period k, and country c, β1 is the
level-1 fixed effects and eijkc is the random individual variation.
The level-2 model is:
β0jkc = γ0jkc + C0jcZjc +K0kcTkc + µ0jc + ν0kc (2)
where Z is a vector of country-cohort characteristics and T is a vector of
country-period characteristics, µ0jc is the residual random effect of country-
cohort j, ν0kc is the residual random effect of country-period k.
The level-3 model is:
γ0 = x0c + ωoc (3)
where ω0c is the residual random effect of country c. In all three models (1),
(2) and (3) µ0j, ν0k and ωoc are assumed normally distributed with mean 0
and variance τµ, τν and τωrespectively.
Age and all country-cohort and country-period level variables are trans-
formed by centering them around their grand mean.
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Results
We begin by estimating a so-called null hierarchical three-level cross-classified
model (Model 0 in Table 1). This model provides information on the variance
components of immigration attitudes at each level of analysis (Level 1 -
individual, Level 2 - country-cohort and country-period, Level 3 - country).
It includes only an intercept, country-cohort random effects, country-period
random effects, country random effects and an individual level residual error
term.
Figure 1: Caterpillar Plot of Country Effects Together with 95% Confidence
Intervals
.
Figure 1 shows the caterpillar plot of country random effects with their
associated 95% confidence intervals from the null model. Countries are shown
in rank order according to their predicted effects. The horizontal zero line
represents the average country in the data. As can be seen from the figure,
the United Kingdom and Belgium are significantly below country average
21
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regarding their positive attitudes to immigration (averaged across cohorts
and periods), while Switzerland, Finland and Sweden hold, at the country
level, significantly above-average attitudes to immigration. Other countries
(the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and Germany) do not differ significantly
from the average country.
Figure 2: Cohort Random Effect Estimates from the Unconditional Hierar-
chical Three-level Cross-Classified Model (Model 0 in Table 1)
.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 display the Best Linear Unbiased Predictions
(BLUPs) of the country-cohort and country-period random effects from the
unconditional model by country with mean equal to zero. As can be seen
from Figure 2, the relationship between cohorts and immigration attitudes in
many countries is not linear. Younger cohorts in certain countries (for exam-
ple Switzerland, Norway, Finland) display at least the same (negative) level of
immigration attitudes as their older counterparts. These visual illustrations
confirm that cross-cohort variations are rather important for understanding
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changes in attitudes toward immigration. Period random effects presented in
Figure 3 reveal that in many countries (particularly Ireland, Germany and
the United Kingdom) there are statistically significant temporal changes re-
garding attitudes to immigration. While in the United Kingdom and Ireland
the level of attitudes to immigration became positive during the last period,
in Germany pro-immigration attitudes slightly declined at the time of the
latest survey (2016) compared to the previous one (2014).
Figure 3: Period Random Effect Estimates from the Unconditional Hierar-
chical Three-level Cross-classified Model (Model 0 in Table 1)
.
In Model 1 in Table 1 we add individual-level control variables to the
null model and present the coefficients together with the associated stan-
dard errors for the fixed part of the models as well as random coefficients
for country-cohorts, country-periods and countries. Consistent with most
previous studies, in general, the young are significantly more supportive of
immigration than the old. Looking at the effects of other covariates, having
a university education, being a member of a minority group and residing
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in an urban area are all significantly positively associated with immigration
attitudes. On the other hand, being female and having income difficulties
are significantly negatively associated with immigration attitudes. Adding
individual level variables to Model 0 has led to lowering the percentage of
unexplained variance not only for the individual level, but also at the cohort
level (Table 1). This is due to some individual level variables likely explain-
ing some of the differences in attitudes to immigration across cohorts. For
instance, it is highly likely that education at the individual level also explains
part of the cohort differences in attitudes to immigration.
Table 1: Results of a Hierarchical Multilevel Cross-Classified Model Explain-
ing Cohort-Differences in Attitudes to Immigration
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Intercept 16.68*** -0.448 15.40*** -0.444 15.35*** -0.428 15.35*** -0.448 15.39*** -0.362
Individual-level
Age -0.015*** -0.002 -0.015*** -0.002 -0.015*** -0.002 -0.034*** -0.004
University degree 3.040*** -0.035 3.038*** -0.035 3.038*** -0.035 3.031*** -0.035
Female -0.170*** -0.032 -0.170*** -0.032 -0.170*** -0.032 -0.169*** -0.032
Urban residence 0.806*** -0.036 0.806*** -0.036 0.807*** -0.036 0.807*** -0.036
Income difficulties -1.434*** -0.047 -1.432*** -0.047 -1.431*** -0.047 -1.432*** -0.047





0.040* -0.017 0.032* -0.014
Political climate of
tradition




Ethnic fractionalization -0.073*** -0.013
Net migration -0.040*** -0.011





0.172*** -0.038 0.172*** -0.038 0.190*** -0.039
Political climate of
tradition
-0.033 -0.061 -0.031 -0.061 -0.044 -0.063
Foreign stock 0.092* -0.04 0.096* -0.04 0.138*** -0.04
Net migration 0.014 -0.023 0.013 -0.023 0.018 -0.023
Unemployment -0.101* -0.044 -0.104* -0.044 -0.085 -0.045
Random
effect estimates
Country 1.698 -0.85 1.708 -0.832 1.608 -0.822 1.768 -0.892 1.136 -0.621
Cohort (in country) 0.502 -0.077 0.107 -0.02 0.1 -0.019 0.1 -0.019 0.054 -0.012
Period (in country) 0.479 -0.088 0.367 -0.068 0.185 -0.036 0.185 -0.036 0.199 -0.039
Individual 33.064 -0.138 29.946 -0.125 29.947 -0.125 29.947 -0.125 29.945 -0.125
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors. Level 1 N: 114,788 Level 2 Country-cohort N: 108;
Level 2 Country-period N: 72; Level 3 Country-level N: 9
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Recall that we hypothesized that individuals who belong to an age-cohort
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that experienced their formative years in a political climate dominated by
the value of equality are significantly more likely to express support for im-
migration (H1), while individuals who experienced their formative years in
a climate dominated by traditionalist values are significantly less likely to
express support for immigration (H2). Models 2 and 3 in Table 1 investigate
these propositions while also controlling for country-period and individual
level factors.
Model 2 in Table 1 shows the results for a model including a measure of
a climate of equality at the country-cohort level, while also controlling for
the political climates of equality and tradition, unemployment, net migration
and foreign stock at the country-period level. The significantly positive effect
of equality at the country-cohort level implies that cohorts that came of age
in times when the political climate in their country emphasized the value
of equality are more likely to hold positive attitudes towards immigration.
Model 3 in Table 1 includes a measure of the principle of tradition in the po-
litical climate at the country-cohort level, while also controlling for individual
as well as period-level factors. The significantly negative coefficient of tra-
dition at the country-cohort level confirms our expectations, assuming that
those cohorts coming of age in a political climate emphasizing traditional
values are significantly less likely to hold positive attitudes to immigration.
Finally, Model 4 includes all independent variables at the individual level
(age, gender, having a university education, being a member of a minority
group, residing in an urban area and having income difficulties), country-
cohort level (political climate of equality at the time cohorts were 18 years
old, political climate of tradition at the time cohorts were 18 years old, per-
centage of university educated within the cohort, net migration at the time
25
Cast in the Same Mould: How politics during the impressionable years shapes attitudes towards immigration in later life
cohorts were 18 years old, ethnic fractionalization at the time cohorts were
18 years old, and unemployment at the time cohorts were 18 years old) and
country-period level (political climate of equality, political climate of tradi-
tion, foreign stock, net migration, unemployment).24 At the country-cohort
level, cohorts exposed to more ethnic diversity (measured as a country’s
ethnic fractionalization and country’s net migration) during their formative
years appear to become more hostile towards immigrants. Similarly, cohorts
coming of age at the time of economic hardship (high unemployment) are
significantly more negative towards immigration than cohorts coming of age
in more affluent times. On the other hand, cohorts with a higher percentage
of university educated individuals have significantly more positive attitudes
to immigration.
The effect of our two main independent variables of interest, equality and
tradition measured at the country-cohort level, remain significant even after
controlling for all other factors at different levels. The results support our ar-
gument that growing up in different political climates may have a long-lasting
effect on (future) political attitudes of entire generations. Those respondents
who were socialized into a political climate that emphasized equality are
significantly more likely to hold positive immigration attitudes compared to
those who came of age in different political climates. Similarly, those cohorts
that spent their formative years in a political climate emphasizing traditional
values are significantly more likely to express negative immigration attitudes.
Moreover, as the median age in the sample is 48 years old, this effect appears
to be long-lasting. At the country-period level, the political climate of equal-
24In the supporting information, we also present models that include each country-
cohort level variable in a stepwise fashion (Table A3.1).
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ity also significantly positively influences immigration attitudes, while, on
the other hand, the political climate of tradition does not exert a statisti-
cally significant effect. As for other country-period control variables, greater
diversity measured as foreign stock leads to more positive attitudes to immi-
gration, while other variables do not reach the conventional level of statistical
significance.
In substantive terms, Model 4 shows that an increase in one percentage
point of equality in the formative political climate leads to a 0.03 increase in
attitudes to immigration on a scale of 0 to 30. In contrast, one percentage
point increase of traditionalism in the formative political climate leads to a
0.06 decrease in attitudes to immigration. Comparing the substantive effects
of the two principles, it appears that traditionalism, given that its effect size
is twice as large as that of equality, has a more substantial (negative) effect
during the formative years on attitudes to immigration than the positive
effect of equality.
Discussion and Conclusion
Drawing on political socialization theory, we posit that a person’s formative
political climate – or, in other words, the political zeitgeist during their im-
pressionable years - explains their attitudes towards immigration later on in
life. Specifically, we hypothesize that exposure to varying levels of certain po-
litical principles in a political climate, namely equality and tradition, during
a person’s youth have opposing effects on his or her attitudes to immigration
in adulthood. We test our hypotheses using micro-attitudinal data that we
integrated with historical political data to study over 100,000 individuals,
belonging to twelve different cohorts from nine European countries.
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The results of the hierarchical age-period-cohort analysis presented here
indicate that cohorts formulate distinct patterns of attitudes towards immi-
gration due to a collective process of political socialization they underwent
during their youth. We find empirical support for the hypotheses that ex-
posure to a political climate fostering principles of equality and tradition
during the formative years affects a person’s attitudes towards immigration
even later in life. When a person comes of age in a political climate where
the principle of equality is widespread, it positively influences the attitudes
towards immigration he or she has later in life. On the other hand, if tra-
dition is a widespread principle in a person’s formative political climate, he
or she is more likely to oppose immigration as adults. These findings are
confirmed by a series of additional analyses and robustness checks, which are
documented in the supporting information.
Our study holds important implications regarding the sources from which
a person’s attitudes towards immigration originate. Traditional analysis gen-
erally investigates the effect of contemporary politics on attitudes. In con-
trast, our study deviates from this to reveal the importance of yesterday’s
politics on today’s attitudes. The findings indicate that contextual expo-
sure to principles of equality and tradition are central to the formulation of
immigration attitudes, regardless of whether or not the person holds these
ideals themselves. Since cohorts occupy the same temporal-spatial political
context during their coming of age, their attitudes towards immigration as
adults reflect this shared political socialization.
The ideals propagated by political elites and their relative popularity
among the polity typically oscillate. Our findings imply that even these subtle
and cyclical shifts have a formative power during the process of the political
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socialization of youth. We contribute to the theoretical understanding of
political socialization, as we believe that the general logic of our argument
should apply to other symbolic attitudes besides immigration. Importantly,
our results demonstrate that cohort differentiation in political behavior does
not require radical shocks such as landmark events or regime change, albeit
their effects are more conducive to an empirical identification. This implies
that principles that are common in a particular political climate have an
implicit normative function for who are socialized amongst them, affecting
their political behavior later in life.
Naturally, our results are subject to some limitations. Our analysis can-
not fully address what makes principles of equality and tradition ebb and
flow in the first place. We cannot entirely rule out the possibility that these
are tied to underlying cyclical changes in the popularity of liberal and conser-
vative ideologies. Typically, socially conservative parties tend to emphasize
tradition while socially liberal parties tend to emphasize equality. Therefore,
the importance of these ideals in the political climate is possibly correlated
to the political ideology of the party that holds power. To address this and
validate our findings, we conduct a series of falsification tests using other
principles typically correlated with liberal or conservative ideologies (e.g.
maintaining law and order and environmentalism), none of which influence
cohorts’ attitudes to immigration (available in the online supporting infor-
mation in Table A6.1). Furthermore, the drawbacks to using cross-sectional
surveys mean that we have not been able to follow how attitudes towards
immigration maturate across the course of a single person’s life. Finally, we
are not able to determine if the principles of equality and tradition affect
individuals in general or only affect those who are undergoing a process of
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political socialization.
These are all important issues that require further exploration. A fruit-
ful avenue for further examining how the ideals of equality or tradition are
causally related to attitudes towards immigration would be in an experimen-
tal setting, such as a priming experiment. Regarding the process of political
socialization, much is still to be learned about how the role of the politi-
cal climate collides with other socializing agents – such as the family or the
school. Finally, future research might also delve into the heterogeneity of
cohort effects by analyzing sub-groups within cohorts.
Political socialization is about the perpetuation of ideals, norms, and
principles from one generation to the next. It is, therefore, worth noting
that based on our findings, we can speculate about public attitudes towards
immigration in future generations. Young people are undergoing socializa-
tion in the current political environment, rendering the ideals, norms, and
principles that predominate in the tenor of politics today highly relevant for
tomorrow. For attitudes towards immigration to become more positive, not
only does traditionalism need to be contained, but also the principle of equal-
ity needs to be widespread. Looking at the current political climate situation
in Europe, the future is rather foreboding, as the continued rise of the radical
right-wing generates exposure to ideals and values which are antithetical to
the formulation of pro-immigration views during a person’s formative years.
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